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OHIO APPELLATE COURT HOLDS THAT STATUTORILY AUTHORIZED AWARDS OF
ATTORNEY’S FEES ARE PROPERLY DECIDED BY ARBITRATORS
By
Nick Fox*
I.

INTRODUCTION
In Corbin v. Kelly Plating Co., the Court of Appeals of Ohio, 8th District

considered an appeal from a plaintiff-appellant for issuance of a statutorily
authorized award of attorney’s fees.1 While in court-annexed arbitration, the
appellant neither presented the issue of attorney’s fees to the arbitral panel, nor
preserved the issue for the trial court to decide.2 After the arbitral award was
confirmed by the court, the appellant motioned the court for the fees.3 Appellant
pursued the sought-after attorney’s fees in the intermediate appellate court.4 As a
matter of first impression, the Court identified a strikingly similar case decided by
the Illinois Supreme Court, and adopted the holding and reasoning nearly
verbatim.5
II.

BACKGROUND
Joe L. Corbin, appellant, worked for appellee, Kelly Plating Company

(“Kelly Plating”).6 At times, Corbin worked a late shift and at other times in a
supervisory role.7 Under both circumstances, he was entitled to earn an increased
wage beyond his base pay.8 Kelly Plating, however, did not consider these factors
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1
Corbin v. Kelly Plating Co., 931 N.E.2d 204, 205 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010).
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Id. at 207.
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Id. at 206.
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Id.
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Cruz v. Nw. Chrysler Plymouth Sales, 688 N.E.2d 653 (1997).
6
Corbin, 931 N.E.2d at 206.
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Id.
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Id.
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when it issued Corbin’s paychecks.9 On January 15, 2008, Corbin filed a civil suit
against Kelly Plating alleging breach of federal and state wage and employment
laws.10 Corbin sought relief in the form of back wages, liquidated damages, and
attorney’s fees under both the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and Ohio’s
wage and overtime law.11
Kelly Plating answered the complaint and filed counterclaims alleging that
Corbin regularly left work early and that he also owed them for various fees for
union dues and uniforms.12 Shortly thereafter, the trial court ordered the case to
proceed through court-annexed arbitration, pursuant to a local rule requiring
arbitration.13 Accordingly, the parties submitted their claims to an arbitral panel
and proceeded through a series of hearings.14 On September 11, 2008, the panel
issued an award whose net amount favored Corbin by $1,100.15 Approximately
one month later, the trial court confirmed the arbitral panel’s decision.16
Just four days later, Corbin motioned to the trial court seeking attorney’s
fees in the amount of nearly $14,000.17 The trial court denied the motion on
grounds that the motion was untimely and that the issue should have either been
properly submitted to the arbitral panel or excepted from their consideration.18
Corbin appealed the trial court’s decision.19
Corbin asked the appellate court to review the trial court’s determination
that denied his request for attorney’s fees.20 Corbin contended that attorney’s fees
are wholly distinct from any judgment award, and are only to be awarded after the
9

Id.
Id.
11
Corbin, 931 N.E.2d at 206 n.2 (referencing Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201219 (2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4111.01-4111.99 (West 2011)).
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Corbin, 931 N.E.2d at 206.
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judgment is entered.21 He further argued that an award of attorney’s fees would be
speculative if issued by an arbitral panel.22 Part of this contention stemmed from
uncertainty accompanying the possibility that the arbitral award would be
appealed.23 Corbin reasoned that at the point in time when the panel was able to
award attorney’s fees, it would be inappropriate to do so.24
III.

ANALYSIS
The appellate court reviewed Corbin’s claims de novo.25 The principal

issue under review was whether a court can properly award statutorily authorized
attorney’s fees after it has confirmed an arbitral award.26 In considering this issue,
the court recognized that it would be required to weigh two important policy
considerations.27 The first is the legislature’s desire to ensure that litigants are
reimbursed for their attorney’s fees in appropriate cases.28 The contrasting
consideration is the safeguarding of the perception that court-annexed arbitration
can provide a less expensive and more expedient means to adjudicate claims.29
The court first examined the trial court’s decision not to award attorney’s
fees post hoc.30 A driving force that influenced the trial court’s decision was their
determination that the arbitrator was in the better position to determine the amount
of reasonable fees.31 Since this was a case of first impression for the appellate
21

Id. at 209.
Corbin, 931 N.E.2d at 210.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 206.
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Id. at 210.
27
Corbin, 931 N.E.2d at 205.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 208.
31
Id.; See Moore v. First Bank of San Luis Obispo, 996 P.2d 706 (Cal. 2000); Dickins v.
Lee, 230 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783 (1991); and Turnberry Assoc. v. Serv. Station Aid, 651 So. 2d
1173 (Fla. 1995).
22
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court, it looked outward for direction to benchmark the trial court’s
determination.32 Specifically, the court considered cases decided in California,
Florida, and Illinois. The court particularly focused on an Illinois decision, Cruz v.
Northwestern Chrysler Plymouth Sales, Inc..33 Cruz involved a dispute stemming
from the sale of an automobile under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act.34 The case was ordered into court-annexed arbitration.35 On the issue
of statutorily authorized attorney’s fees, the court held that in order to recover
attorney’s fees, the plaintiff must present a claim for them to the arbitration
panel.36 The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court, which
awarded attorney’s fees despite the fact that the party failed to properly appeal the
arbitral award during the prescribed time frame.37 The Cruz court emphasized that
the arbitral panel is best suited to decipher and establish an award of attorney’s
fees because, “the court will know virtually nothing about the issues in the case,
how difficult it was to litigate, or how effectively counsel-represented his clients.
The arbitration panel, not the . . . court, is therefore the proper body to rule on
statutory fee requests.”38 The Ohio court in the instant case virtually adopted the
holding and reasoning of the Cruz court.39 The court then addressed what
constitutes reasonable attorney’s fees in Ohio as specified by the Ohio Rule of
Professional Conduct.40 “The arbitration panel is familiar with the time, novelty,
nature, experience, and range of possible results in the cases before them.
Therefore, [they] are in the best possible position to determine what [is] a
reasonable fee.”41

32

Corbin, 931 N.E.2d at 208.
Id. (citing Cruz v. Nw. Chrysler Plymouth Sales, Inc., 688 N.E.2d 653, 654 (Ill. 1997)).
34
Id.
35
Id. (citing Cruz, 688 N.E.2d at 654).
36
Id. at 208.
37
Corbin, 931 N.E.2d at 208.
38
Id. (citing Cruz, 688 N.E.2d at 657-58).
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 209.
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In addressing Corbin’s contentions that attorney’s fees are the exclusive

domain of the courts, and such an award by an arbitral panel would be improper,
the court once again relied on Cruz.42 The Cruz court articulated its rationale that
directly rebutted Corbin’s position, by suggesting that the entire system of
mandatory arbitration rested upon the condition that defendants can rely on the
arbitrator’s award as fixing their maximum exposure to liability.43 The court
further speculated that the if courts were permitted to award attorney’s fees on top
of the award issued by arbitrators, few if any defendants would accept the
arbitrator’s decision as binding.44 Additionally, the court reasoned that every case
where attorney’s fees are possible would require the participation of a trial court to
determine the award.45 This is impractical and detracts from the efficiency that
court-annexed arbitration provides.46 Ultimately, the court arrived at a decision
based largely upon reasoning borrowed from Cruz to affirm the order of the trial
court, denying the award of attorney’s fees.47
IV.

SIGNIFICANCE
Corbin is significant because it establishes a precedent for all would-be

litigants in Ohio to follow when pursuing an arbitral award of attorney’s fees. The
court signals a tendency to favor preservation of the efficiencies of court-annexed
arbitration over preserving individual rights to full compensation for incurred
costs. This is especially evidenced by the court’s acknowledgement that Corbin
was in-fact entitled to the attorney’s fees.48 Moving forward, litigants will benefit

42

Corbin, 931 N.E.2d at 209.
Id.; see Cruz, 688 N.E.2d at 657.
44
Corbin, 931 N.E.2d at 208; see Cruz, 688 N.E.2d at 657.
45
Corbin, 931 N.E.2d at 210.
46
Id.
47
Corbin, 931 N.E.2d at 211.
48
Id. at 210.
43
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from knowing that untimely motions for attorney’s fees that stem from courtannexed arbitration will not be entertained by Ohio courts.

